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INTRODUCTION 
This Article focuses on some of the practical challenges that the American 
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (“ASCAP”) faces in its day to day 
business efforts to license the public performing right in copyrighted musical works 
in the digital age under its antitrust consent decree.1  In looking to the practical, this 
Article affirmatively does not delve into the development and use of the United 
States’ antitrust laws in setting fees for the public performance of the music in 
ASCAP’s repertory.  In addition, the author notes that the comments made herein 
are necessarily constrained by having to navigate between the Scylla and Charybdis 
of ASCAP’s many pending court proceedings, negotiations and restrictions of 
protective orders.  Nonetheless, while being mindful of these limitations, there is 
still much to say, from a practical perspective, beginning with:  what does it mean 
to apply for an ASCAP license under ASCAP’s consent decree? 
I.  AN ASCAP LICENSE 
ASCAP licenses are incredibly efficient means for giving users blanket access to 
 
 *  Joan M. McGivern is the General Counsel and Senior Vice President of the American 
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (“ASCAP”).  The views expressed in this commentary 
are solely those of the author.  The author wishes to thank her many colleagues at work for their 
contributions in the preparation of this Article. 
 1.  United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, No.  41-1395, 2001 WL 
1589999 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2001) (providing the consent decree).  ASCAP’s first consent decree was 
entered in 1941.  See United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 1940–1943 
Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 56,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).  Established in 1914, ASCAP is the oldest and largest 
performing rights organization (“PRO”) in the United States.  There are two other U.S. PROs:  
Broadcast Music, Inc. (“BMI”), which operates under its own consent decree, and the Society of 
European Stage Authors and Composers, Inc. (“SESAC”), which does not operate under a consent 
decree.  See United States v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,941, modified by 1996-
1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,378 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).  However, SESAC was sued by certain television 
stations, asserting SESAC had formed a cartel in violation of, inter alia, Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2.  The district court recently denied SESAC's motion to dismiss and thus, that 
litigation is ongoing.  Meredith Corp. v. SESAC, LLC, 09 Civ. 9177 (NRB), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
24517 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011). 
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perform without restriction the over 8.5 million copyrighted songs and musical 
works of ASCAP’s over 400,000 members and of the members of foreign PROs 
who choose to affiliate with ASCAP (sometimes referred to as the “ASCAP 
Repertory”).  The music user incurs no costs for locating copyright owners or for 
negotiating with them, nor is the music user burdened with any transaction costs 
that might otherwise be associated with preclearing the right to publicly perform 
the works. 
When a music user, or licensee, pays for the license, ASCAP also takes care of 
all the tasks associated with distributing the license fees as royalties to its members, 
pursuant to ASCAP’s distribution rules.2  These tasks include, among others, 
analyzing tremendous volumes of music performance data from all forms of media, 
sending royalty statements and checks to ASCAP’s members (or more recently, 
providing online access to these statements and direct depositing checks), 
answering our members’ questions and building and managing huge databases and 
online access services for our members.  The licensee is freed from dealing with 
any of these tasks. 
Once a music user has merely applied in writing for a license, which it can do 
with no money down, it is legally immunized from being sued by ASCAP’s 
members for infringement of the members’ works.  How is it possible that music 
users are allowed to simply apply for a license, enjoy the benefits of a license, but 
then not be obliged to pay until they and ASCAP have agreed upon a fee for their 
usage?  Why is ASCAP barred from exercising what is a copyright owners’ normal 
right to sue for infringement if usage and payment terms have not been agreed 
upon?  The answer lies in ASCAP’s consent decree or as we refer to it, “AFJ2.”  
Under AFJ2, as well as its earlier versions, ASCAP must grant a license upon 
application and the music user—whom in ASCAP parlance, we call an 
“applicant”—need not pay anything until an agreement is reached or fees are set by 
the ASCAP “rate court.”3  (All disputes regarding the setting of ASCAP license 
fees are heard by the same judge in the Federal District Court for the Southern 
District of New York, whom ASCAP refers to as the “rate court judge.”4) 
 
 2. The rules and regulations govern distribution of royalties to members, including the Writers’ 
Distribution Plans, the Writers’ and Publishers’ Distribution Formulas, the Weighting Rules and 
Weighting Formula.  ASCAP’s Survey and Distribution System:  Rules and Policies, ASCAP (Sept. 
2010),  http://www.ascap.com/members/governingDocuments/pdf/drd.pdf.  Distributions are made 
twelve times a year.  Id.  See generally I. Fred Koenigsberg, Performing Rights in Music and 
Performing Rights Organizations, Revisited, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 355 (2003) (providing more 
background on ASCAP). 
 3. See Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 2001 WL 1589999, at *4 (“ASCAP is 
hereby ordered and directed to grant to any music user making a written request therefore a non-
exclusive license to perform all the work in the ASCAP repertory . . . .”), *7 (“Pending the completion 
of any such negotiations or proceedings, the music user shall have the right to perform any, some or all 
of the works in the ASCAP repertory to which its application pertains, without payment of any fee or 
other compensation . . . .”). 
 4. See id. at *1 (“This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter hereof and of all parties 
hereto.”).  Currently, ASCAP’s rate court judge is the Honorable Denise Cote, who was appointed by 
the Chief Judge of that court to succeed the late Honorable William C. Conner, who had presided over 
ASCAP’s cases for over thirty years.  See Douglas Martin, William Conner, Judge Expert in Patent 
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Upon receipt of an application, AFJ2 places the burden on ASCAP to engage the 
applicant either by quoting a reasonable license fee or by asking for the data it 
needs to quote a fee.5  ASCAP’s members do not have the option of saying “no” to 
the public performance of their music by such applicants—as upon entering into a 
membership agreement, members forego such a right—unless they choose to 
license the public performance of their works directly, in which case the direct 
license can be limited by the copyright owner.6  If ASCAP and the applicant cannot 
reach an agreement on fees within the time allotted by AFJ2, it is the applicant who 
has the first opportunity to apply to ASCAP’s rate court for the determination of a 
reasonable fee; after a further period of time, ASCAP also has an opportunity to 
apply to the court.7  In either case, ASCAP bears the burden of proof to establish 
the reasonableness of the fee it seeks.8 
II.  GENERAL CHALLENGES POSED BY DIGITAL MUSIC USERS 
Since its founding in 1914, setting fees and obtaining payment to compensate its 
members and thereby secure adequate compensation for creators and copyright 
holders has always been a challenge for ASCAP, especially each time a new 
medium for performing music has been introduced.9  Following ASCAP’s 
formation, it took three years of litigation before ASCAP was able to license 
restaurants and hotels that were publicly performing music.10  Today, working 
 
Law, Dies at 89, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 20, 2009, at A16; Biography of Hon. Denise Cote, INREACH, 
http://www.legalspan.com/catalog2/faculty.asp?UserID=2009051399319481045%20%20%20%20%20
%20%20&OwnerColor=%2301519A&recID=20090513-993194-80128  (last visited Mar. 20, 2011). 
 5. See Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 2001 WL 1589999, at *6 (“ASCAP 
shall, upon receipt of a written request for a license . . . advise the music user in writing of the fee that it 
deems reasonable for the license requested or the information that it reasonably requires in order to 
quote a reasonable fee.”). 
 6. See ASCAP’s Membership Agreement, ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/join/ (last visited Mar. 
20, 2011) (noting that the agreement is the same for writer and publisher members). 
 7. See Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 2001 WL 1589999, at *6.  The consent 
decree provides: 
If the parties are unable to reach agreement within sixty (60) days . . . the music user may apply 
to the Court for a determination of a reasonable fee retroactive to the date of the written request 
for a license . . . . If the parties are unable to agree upon a reasonable fee within ninety (90) days 
from the date when ASCAP advises the music user of the fee that it deems reasonable or requests 
additional information from the music user, and if the music user has not applied to the Court for 
a determination of a reasonable fee, ASCAP may apply to the Court for the determination of a 
reasonable fee retroactive to the date of a written request for a license . . . . 
Id. 
 8. See id. 
 9. For example, radio broadcasters resisted being licensed for publicly performing music for 
many years, until that right was finally upheld.  Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. Am. Auto. Accessories Co., 
5 F.2d 411 (6th Cir. 1925). 
 10. Herbert v. Shanley, 242 U.S. 591, 594–95 (1916).  In Herbert v. Shanley, a restaurant and a 
hotel each claimed that they were not charging for the music, and therefore did not need a public 
performance license.  Id.  Justice Holmes, ruling in ASCAP’s favor, wrote: 
If the rights under the copyright are infringed only by a performance where money is taken at the 
door, they are very imperfectly protected . . . . The defendants’ performances are not 
eleemosynary . . . . It is true that the music is not the sole object, but neither is the food, which 
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within the confines of ASCAP’s consent decree, this pre-existing struggle has 
become exacerbated in many respects in the digital space. 
Digital users often question whether their particular uses of music really require 
a license.  Not wanting to be sued, they apply for an ASCAP license anyway 
qualifying their requests as being “only to the extent such licenses are required.”11    
Such qualified requests are typically accompanied by disputes regarding the scope 
and cost of the requested license.  Even after applying for an ASCAP license, some 
applicants dispute ASCAP’s need for usage and revenue data to quote a fee, assert 
that they really are not performing music at all, and/or assert that third parties are 
responsible for the performances.12  During these disputes, applicants continue to 
enjoy the benefit of the consent decree’s protection against infringement suits  
Some digital services argue that they are not responsible for licensing 
performances because their services’ “terms and conditions of use,” explicitly shift 
licensing obligations to their users.  Services such as these permit the public or 
subscribers to upload digital files (so called “user generated content” or “UGC”) 
and knowingly host these files for others to access and share.  These services assert 
that the responsibility for an ASCAP license rests with the often anonymous 
uploaders of the UGC content, because when these uploaders submit content to 
these services, the uploaders are asked to warrant and represent that they have all 
 
probably could be got cheaper elsewhere.  The object is a repast in surroundings that to people of 
limited powers of conversation, or disliking the rival noise, give a luxurious pleasure not to be 
had from eating a silent meal.  If music did not pay, it would be given up . . . . Whether it pays or 
not, the purpose of employing it is profit and that is enough. 
Id. 
 11. See, e.g., infra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing license request of MobiTV).  See 
also infra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing license request of YouTube). 
 12. ASCAP is not alone in confronting such behavior from applicants.  For example, ASCAP’s 
main competitor in the United States, BMI, just recently filed a petition against AOL Inc. (“AOL”), 
asserting that: 
AOL to date has refused to provide . . . fundamental information to BMI.  Instead, AOL has 
insisted that it is entitled to an open-ended automatic license under the BMI Consent Decree for 
whatever websites and other transmission facilities it chooses to employ to make public 
performances . . . —without having to provide a comprehensive list of those websites and other 
transmission facilities to BMI in advance.  AOL has also played fast and loose with other 
fundamental aspects of the license it seeks, selectively disclosing which portions of its websites 
it wants excluded from its license because they are licensed by third parties, failing altogether to 
disclose which upstream or downstream performances it wants included or excluded from its 
licenses, and failing to update BMI on an ongoing basis as to any new and additional properties 
AOL seeks to cover under the license application . . . . In the more than three years that have 
elapsed since AOL’s May 2007 application, and despite numerous further requests from BMI, 
AOL has persisted in refusing to provide a comprehensive description of the distribution 
platforms and types of music uses for which it seeks a license.  Instead, it has continued to 
demand a performing rights license for whatever activities it chooses to undertake that are 
‘licensable public performances’ under the Copyright Act . . . . To make matters worse, AOL has 
also asserted that certain performances of music within the AOL portal and websites have 
already been licensed by unspecified third parties and disclaimed any responsibility to license or 
pay for them . . . . AOL’s request for such an indefinite, boundaryless [sic], and everchanging 
license fails to provide BMI with adequate parameters to use in its calculation of an appropriate 
blanket license fee. 
Petition, Broadcast Music, Inc. v. AOL Inc., Civ. No. 10-9300 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2010), at ¶¶ 1, 16–18 
(internal citations omitted). 
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the necessary rights in the material—including the right to publicly perform any 
music contained in the file. 
Some users, even though they have applied for an ASCAP license, claim that 
they are simply promoting ASCAP members’ music or their use of music is 
exempted as a “fair use” under U.S. copyright law.13 
Some services suggest that ASCAP utilize the “notice and takedown” provisions 
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) if ASCAP wishes to object to 
any performances taking place on the services’ sites.14  But because these services 
have applied for a license, using the DMCA’s procedures is not an option for 
ASCAP.  Why?  These services, by reason of their written applications for a license 
under the terms of ASCAP’s Consent Decree, are protected from claims that they 
are making infringing performances. 
III.  CHALLENGE #1:  THE SIMILARLY SITUATED DIGITAL USER 
With these general challenges as a backdrop, there are three specific practical 
issues that ASCAP confronts when endeavoring to license digital music users under 
its consent decree.  The first is satisfying the requirement that ASCAP license 
similarly situated users similarly, including quoting them comparable fees.15  In the 
world of radio and television, it was, and still is, relatively easier to compare 
stations to stations and arrive at fees that allow ASCAP to license “similarly 
situated” stations “similarly.”  Such relative ease of comparison likewise exists in 
physical establishment industries such as bars, hotels and restaurants.  In those 
cases, setting standard industry-wide fees is fairly straightforward and highly 
efficient; in more mature industries, ASCAP frequently negotiates with industry 
associations or committees representative of the industry users.  ASCAP 
consequently is able to create or negotiate “form” licenses that can efficiently be 
offered to all music users in a particular industry.  In the digital space, however, the 
whole goal is to have a differentiated, unique business model and service that is 
unlike any other in the market—or at least better than the others. 
Citing the uniqueness and “next generation” aspects of their services, digital 
 
 13. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (providing fair use factors). 
 14. See id. § 512.  Although called the DMCA, the Act was the Online Copyright Infringement 
Liability Limitation Act of 1998, which added § 512.  Digital Millenium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 
105-304, § 201, 112 Stat. 2860, 2877 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512). 
 15. See United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, No.  41-1395, 2001 WL 
1589999, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2001) (“ASCAP is hereby enjoined and restrained from:  . . . 
Entering into, recognizing, enforcing or claiming any rights under any license for rights of public 
performance which discriminates in license fees or other terms and conditions between licensees 
similarly situated”).  The court defines “similarly situated” as: 
mean[ing] music users or licensees in the same industry that perform ASCAP music and that 
operate similar businesses and use music in similar ways and with similar frequency; factors 
relevant to determining whether music users or licensees are similarly situated include, but are 
not limited to, the nature and frequency of musical performances, ASCAP’s cost of 
administering licenses, whether the music users or licensees compete with one another, and the 
amount and source of the music users’ revenue. 
Id. 
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services often attempt to negotiate bespoke, custom tailored licenses for their 
services, arguing that their activities do not fit within any of ASCAP’s form 
Internet licenses.16  Nonetheless, these “new” services frequently do fit within the 
parameters of ASCAP’s form licenses because their salient characteristics are 
similar to those of other users.  Thus, even when a the service believes it is a unique 
“new kid on the block,” very often, the service can still use one of ASCAP’s form 
licenses.  The reason that ASCAP presses its form licenses has not only to do with 
maximizing the efficiencies in administration of its licenses, but also with 
satisfying its obligation to license similarly situated users similarly. 
Developing form licenses for use with digital services, in order to follow the 
strictures of ASCAP’s consent decree, has been an ongoing process; and, even 
though ASCAP has been licensing digital services since 1995, we still refer to these 
licenses as “experimental licenses.”  By contrast, for decades, ASCAP has 
negotiated, and on occasion litigated with, radio and television “industry 
committees” that are able to represent the entire class of businesses publicly 
performing music.  Unlike radio and television, there is no equivalent industry-
wide committee for digital services with which ASCAP can negotiate form 
licenses.  Even as the Internet matures, it remains doubtful that any such 
representative industry committee will emerge to represent digital services in 
negotiating, class-wide, for digital music users who require ASCAP licenses. 
It should also be noted that the rapid evolution of digital services poses an 
additional challenge to ASCAP under its decree, a provision of which is implicated 
in the emergence of a new user group.  Pursuant to AFJ2, ASCAP cannot rely upon 
fees agreed upon with a user for the first five years of licensing a new category of 
music user as evidence of a reasonable fee in a rate court, but it nonetheless 
remains obligated to license similar services similarly.17 
IV.  CHALLENGE # 2:  THE “THROUGH-TO-THE-AUDIENCE” 
LICENSE REQUEST 
The second practical issue that ASCAP faces in licensing digital services is 
satisfying AFJ2’s requirement that ASCAP quote a fee for a “through-to-the-
audience” (“TTTA”) license request to any music user that “transmits content to 
other music users with whom it has an economic relationship relating to that 
content.”18  Upon receipt of such a request, ASCAP must quote a fee which “shall 
 
 16. See, e.g., ASCAP Experimental License Agreement for Interactive Services—Release 2.1, 
ASCAP,  http://www.ascap.com/weblicense/reports/pdfs/InteractiveLicenseAgreement_R2_1.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2011); ASCAP Experimental License Agreement for Multiple Services—Release 1.1, 
ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/weblicense/reports/pdfs/ASCAPExperimentalLicenseAgreementfor 
MultipleSitesandServices.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2011); ASCAP Experimental License Agreement for 
Non-Interactive Services—Release 5.1, ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/weblicense/reports/pdfs/Non-
InteractiveLicenseAgreementR5_1.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2011). 
 17. See Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 2001 WL 1589999, at *7. 
 18. See id. at *4.  The consent decree requires ASCAP: 
to issue, upon request, a through-to-the-audience license to a broadcaster, an on-line user, a 
background/foreground music service, and an operator of any yet-to-be-developed technology 
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take into account the value of all performances made pursuant to the license.”19  
This sweeping concept is more easily understood by comparing the old linear 
broadcast licensing model to the models which ASCAP is not called upon to 
license. 
In the broadcast world, the historic economic relationships between the music 
users were linear.  While quoting reasonable fees in such contexts required work, 
the effort involved to arrive at a license structure that took into account the full 
value of all the performances being made was comparatively more straightforward 
and measurable.  This is easier to understand if one looks at the following 
illustration regarding the original cable television model. 
  
 
that transmits content to other music users with whom it has an economic relationship relating to 
that content; . . . The fee for a though-to-the-audience license shall take into account the value of 
all performances made pursuant to the license. 
Id.  See also id. at *3 (“‘Through-to-the-Audience License’ means a license that authorizes the 
simultaneous or so-called ‘delayed’ performances of ASCAP music that are contained in content 
transmitted or delivered by a music user to another music user with whom the licensee has an economic 
relationship relating to that content . . . .”). 
 19. Id. at *4 (emphasis added). 
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As can be seen in the top portion of the illustration, the content travels in a linear 
fashion:  from the cable program networks to the cable system operators and then 
on to the cable systems’ subscribers.  But ASCAP’s licensing of this industry, as 
the bottom half of the illustration reflects, does not follow this linear pattern.  In 
fact, after many years of litigation, ASCAP and the cable industry arrived at a two 
part licensing structure.20  How did this structure evolve?  It arose from the fact that 
the cable program networks demanded from ASCAP “through-to-the-audience” 
licenses.  Thus, ASCAP came to license the cable program networks for their 
programming, which is transmitted to cable operators (and satellite operators), and 
then retransmitted by these operators to subscribers.  The license was intended to 
capture the value of all the performances taking place upon transmission and 
retransmission, as each transmission is a separate public performance.21  In 
addition, to license all the performances being received by the subscriber, ASCAP 
also licenses cable operators for the noncable program network content that the 
operators deliver, referred to as “locally originated programming,” and 
advertisements that cable operators insert. 
That was the old linear world.  Licensing in two parts, such as the cable model’s 
approach, was ultimately doable and possible to administer on a cost effective 
basis.  Fast forwarding to the new world:  broadcasters and cable program networks 
no longer deploy their content in such a linear fashion; they now also apply for 
“through-to-the-audience” requests that are ever more expansive, and seek to apply 
to an ever wider category of uses.  For example, ASCAP received the following 
request from the Radio Music License Committee (“RMLC”) on behalf of a 
significant portion of the radio industry in December of 2009, seeking to cover all 
transmissions to all platforms, including “wireless platforms or via any other 
platform capable of displaying or disseminating a [radio] Stations’ transmissions 
or . . . as applicable, the Station owners’ radio division online or wireless 
transmissions.”22  Shortly after receipt of this request, ASCAP and the RMLC 
 
 20. One of the first cable program network rate court cases was commenced in 1985.  See Am. 
Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 912 F.2d 563, 566 
(2d Cir. 1990).  Further litigation ensued.  It was not until 2002, seventeen years later, that the first 
industry form licenses were finally adopted.   See In re Application of MobiTV, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 2d. 
206, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (pending appeal in the Second Circuit, No. 10-CV-3161 (2d Cir. Dec. 15, 
2010). 
 21. See David v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 752, 759 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
 22. Letter from R. Bruce Rich, Counsel, RMLC, to Richard H. Reimer, Counsel, ASCAP (Dec. 
11, 2009) (see Amended Petition / Application of the Cromwell Group, Inc. and Affiliates, et al. for the 
Determination of Reasonable Final License Fees at exhibit 1, In re Application of the Cromwell Group, 
Inc., No. 10 CV 5210 (DLC) (MHD) (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2010)).  The representative of RMLC writes: 
As for scope, the RMLC hereby requests a “through-to-the-listener” license from ASCAP 
covering whatever public performances of ASCAP-repertoire music occur in either (i) the 
Stations’ (including any translators’) transmissions to users for which an ASCAP license is 
required, however and whenever distributed, including, without limitation, all broadcast 
transmissions, digital transmissions, high-definition transmissions, and transmissions over 
Internet and wireless platforms or via any other platform capable of displaying or disseminating 
a Stations’ transmissions or (ii), as applicable, the Station owners’ radio division online or 
wireless transmissions. 
Id. 
MCGIVERN Final 12/5/2011  8:14 PM 
2011] THE CHALLENGES OF ENFORCEMENT IN THE DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 639 
jointly applied to the rate court for determination of final fees.23 
Another example of an expansive TTTA license request that ASCAP received 
was from YouTube in 2006.24  YouTube requested a retroactive license to cover 
“all performances and YouTube incorporated programming . . . for which a license 
is required.”25  It further sought to cover “programming or performances on 
youtube.com,” and “any location that YouTube distributes its services.”26  That 
application raised a host of questions, such as:  What was the full scope of all the 
performances sought to be licensed?  Was user-generated content uploaded by 
anonymous users to be covered?  Was user-generated content included within 
“YouTube incorporated programming”?  Were YouTube videos embedded by users 
on third party sites to be covered—even when those embeds were arguably not, 
distributed by YouTube?  Were there actual quantifiable, economic relationships 
between YouTube and these third party sites containing embeds, such that in 
quoting a fee, ASCAP could take into account the value of all the performances to 
be covered?  The enormity of the possible scope of the requested license sought by 
YouTube is illustrated by the following diagram. 
 
 23. See Amended Petition / Application of the Cromwell Group, Inc. and Affiliates, et al. for the 
Determination of Reasonable Final License Fees, In re Application of the Cromwell Group, Inc., No. 10 
CV 5210 (DLC) (MHD) (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2010). 
 24. Letter from Zahavah Levine, General Counsel & Vice President Business Affairs, YouTube, 
Inc., to Chris Amenita, Senior Vice President, ASCAP (Sept. 25, 2006) (see Application of YouTube, 
LLC f/k/a YouTube, Inc., United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, Civ. No. 41-
1395 (DLC) (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2008).  The YouTube representative wrote: 
YouTube, Inc. hereby requests a blanket license fee quotation for a two-year period effective 
with the launch of the beta version of the site in May 200[5], to cover any public performances 
of ASCAP music in YouTube, Inc. programming for which a license is required.  ASCAP's fee 
quotations should be “through-to-the-listener,” encompassing any public performances for which 
a license is required as rendered by YouTube, Inc. on youtube.com or any location through 
which YouTube, Inc. may distribute its services. 
Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
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By mid-2008, several years after YouTube had applied for a license, and efforts 
to agree on the scope of YouTube’s application had failed, ASCAP applied to the 
rate court to set a fee.27  More than a year after the case had been pending, the 
definitive scope of the license remained unclear.  When pressed to take a position, 
YouTube’s counsel explained its request to the rate court as follows: 
I mean, to be candid.  It’s [i.e., the request] meant to be circular . . . [W]e don’t want 
to apply for more than we need, and we knew ASCAP would take the position that 
you do require a license for it, so to avoid not getting the benefit of the full protection 
of the consent decree we applied for what we require a license and if we have a 
disagreement whether we require a license on this we will have to bring it before you 
[i.e., the rate court judge] one way or the other.28 
Indeed, under ASCAP’s consent decree as currently written, digital service 
applicants have no incentive to narrow their TTTA requests because the more 
expansive the requests, the better protected they are from an infringement action. 
Yet another illustration of a TTTA license request comes from the application of 
MobiTV, made in late 2003.29  MobiTV is an audio and audio-visual aggregator of 
 
 27. See Application of YouTube, LLC f/k/a YouTube, Inc., Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & 
Publishers, Civ. No. 41-1395 (DLC). 
 28. Transcript of Sept. 16, 2009 Conference at 28–29, Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & 
Publishers, Civ. No. 41-1395 (DLC). 
 29. Letter from Jeff Bartee, Vice President of Finance, Idetic, Inc., to  Richard Reimer, Counsel, 
ASCAP (Nov. 11, 2003) (on file with the public court files in In re Application of MobiTV, Inc., 712 F. 
Supp. 2d 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)).  The representative of Idetic, Inc. writes: 
Idetic, Inc. [now known as MobiTV, Inc.] is offering a service that allows mobile handset users 
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content which delivers that content to wireless carriers.  The diagram above 
indicates the flow of content to subscribers of the wireless carriers. 
  
As the right side of the illustration shows, the content that MobiTV aggregates 
and bundles, typically into channels, is varied and comes from many content 
providers, cable program networks, broadcast networks, background music 
providers and record labels supplying music videos.  On the other side of the 
illustration are the wireless carriers to which MobiTV delivers the aggregated 
content.  Some of these content providers and wireless carriers applied to ASCAP 
for their own TTTA licenses; other carriers did not.30  Sorting out how to comply 
with the consent decree’s obligation to quote a fee for the value of all the 
performances and the economic relationships between these music users, with 
overlapping license requests, is a fascinating challenge for ASCAP created by new 
technology.31 
V.  CHALLENGE #3:  VALUING ALL PERFORMANCES IN NON-
REVENUE MODELS 
The third practical issue arises from the digital business models where revenue 
is driven by hardware sales and ad sales from high site traffic and not necessarily 
from content, per se.  How should the value of all the performances of the musical 
works be measured if revenue is difficult to apportion or if the provision of content 
is not directly tied to revenue, yet the music content plainly adds “value” to the 
digital business and the overall user experience? 
Who would want to own an Apple iPad or iPhone if it could not be used to 
access and enjoy creative content, at least in part?  Even taking into account 
Apple’s excellent products, can it be argued that consumers’ desire for content, 
particularly music, drove sales of Apple’s products?  Whatever Apple’s payments 
to creators of content have been, it is safe to say the revenues reaped by Apple from 
the sales of its hardware far outstrip the compensation flowing to content creators.32 
 
to access television and other content by aggregating television and other audio/visual content 
for transmission over telecommunications networks.  Idetic, Inc., its subsidiaries and affiliates, 
are hereby requesting “through to the audience/viewer” performing rights licenses pursuant to 
Article IX of the ASCAP Second Amended government consent decree, only to the extent that 
such licenses are required, for the period commencing November l1, 2003 forward. 
Id. 
 30. See, e.g., In re Cellco P’ship, 663 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); United States v. Am. 
Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Performers, 607 F. Supp. 2d 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 31. ASCAP has filed an appeal with the Second Circuit from a decision rendered in In re 
Application of MobiTV, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 2d 206. 
 32. See, e.g., Apple Reports First Quarter Results, APPLE (Jan. 18, 2011), 
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2011/01/18results.html (reporting Apple’s revenues of $26.74 billion in 
the fiscal 2011 first quarter, with a net quarterly profit of $6 billion); Philip Michaels & Jason Snell, 
Apple Tallies Record Revenue on Mac, iPad, and iPhone Sales, MACWORLD (July 20, 2010, 4:52 PM), 
http://www.macworld.com/article/152825/2010/07/apple_3rdquarter_results.html (reporting that the 
strong debut sales of the iPad generated $15.7 billion in sales and a profit of $3.25 billion during 
Apple’s fiscal third quarter and a rise in profits of seventy-eight percent over the last year’s third 
quarter). 
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The YouTube service is another example:  at the time it applied for an ASCAP 
license, media reports indicated that its revenues were low, and some reports 
claimed the service was “losing money.”33  There was obvious “value” in a service 
that Google purchased for a reported $1.65 billion, but that value did not flow back 
to the creators and owners of music, which had made and continue to make 
YouTube so popular.34  The ASCAP members whose works were popular and 
performed on YouTube’s service in its early years became essentially compulsory 
investors, with no ability to enjoy a reasonable pro rata share of the value received 
by YouTube’s founders.  Even if YouTube’s revenues grow and it comes to pay 
high license fees, the ASCAP members whose music will be popular and 
performed in the future will not necessarily be the same ASCAP members whose 
music contributed to helping YouTube in its early years. 
And this brings me to my last point.  In the linear broadcast world, ASCAP 
could use revenue as a factor in setting a license fee, not exclusively, but certainly 
as a factor.  In the digital space, however, revenue is not as reliable an indicator of 
value; instead, value and revenue can be fundamentally disconnected, making 
revenue an inadequate proxy for compensation of the content creators that have 
helped to grow these businesses.  This disconnect seems most striking in the case of 
music, even though music is being used and performed more intensively than ever 
to build new digital services as well as to spur the sales of digital products which 
allow ready access to music. 
Creators understandably are left wondering what happened to the Copyright Act 
ensuring that there are incentives for creation and fair compensation for use.  Just 
how should the balance that the Copyright Act is supposed to provide between 
creators and users be restored?  How can creators, especially music creators and 
music copyright holders, be accorded meaningful participation in the “value” and 
the billions in revenues that flow to technology companies?  ASCAP is working 
assiduously on behalf of its members to meet the challenges posed by these 
questions head on.  In that regard, it is helpful to remember the words of Professor 
Kernochan, for whom Columbia’s Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts 
was named, when he spoke of the need to take the longer and broader range view of 
the struggles of copyright owners for fair compensation.  Some twenty-five years 
ago, he observed that: 
Over the years, ASCAP, and later BMI, did battle with each developing user industry: 
 
 33. See Bobbie Johnson, Does YouTube Actually Make Any Money?, GUARDIAN TECH. BLOG 
(Apr. 7, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/blog/2009/apr/07/youtube-video-losses. 
 34. See Johnson, supra note 33; Paul R. La Monica, Google to Buy YouTube for $1.65 Billion, 
CNNMONEY (Oct. 9, 2006, 5:43 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2006/10/09/technology/ 
googleyoutube_deal/.  Indeed, now, despite YouTube having its own corporate form, it is merely a 
product line of Google’s that contributes to Google’s overall enterprise.  In the fourth quarter of 2010, 
Google reported revenues of $8.44 billion and their employees were granted ten percent salary increases 
across the board starting in January 2011.  See Amir Efrati & Scott Morrison, Google to Give Staff 10% 
Raise, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870352360457560 
5273596157634.html; Google Announces Fourth Quarter and Fiscal Year 2010 Results and 
Management Changes, GOOGLE INVESTOR RELATIONS (Jan. 20, 2011), 
http://investor.google.com/earnings/2010/Q4_google_earnings.html. 
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with the movies (particularly the exhibitors) in both silent and “talkie” eras; with 
radio; with television; with jukebox owners, cable operators and public broadcasters.  
The adversaries keep coming.  Old ones find new grounds for resistance; new 
industries raise new problems.35 
Throughout ASCAP’s history, the Society has vigorously defended the rights of 
its members, finding paths to secure fair compensation for its music creator and 
music publisher members, and will continue to do so in order to ensure that 
incentives to create new music will remain.  In that spirit, it is hoped that this 
Symposium, titled Collective Management of Copyright:  Solution or Sacrifice, 
will help seed ideas for solutions to these challenges confronted by music creators 




 35. John Kernochan, Music Performing Rights Organizations in the United States of America:  
Special Characteristics, Restraints, and Public Attitudes, 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 333, 344 
(1986). 
